Relay3rV1
November 11, 2020
Liquidity drainage via serial contract deployer withdrawals. Classic rug mechanics.
FORENSIC REPORT
Time of Death: November 11, 2020, 03:47 UTC. The specimen, identified as Relay3rV1 (Chain ID: 1), arrived at our facility already expired, having suffered acute liquidity exsanguination. Initial vitals showed promise—deployer seeded liquidity pools with apparent legitimacy. The contract appeared viable. It was not.
Cause of Death Analysis: Examination of the blockchain ledger reveals a textbook liquidity extraction event. The deployer, operating from address 0xaa9e20bab58d013220d632874e9fe44f8f971e4d, performed multiple sequential withdrawals from the liquidity pools. Each transaction methodically siphoned reserves—no panic, no accident, just the steady drip of premeditated capital flight. The deployer retained exclusive control over pool access, allowing them to exit at will while retail participants remained locked in. This is predation with proper formatting.
Contributing Factors: The victim exhibited every warning sign of terminal rug pullosis. Deployer-controlled liquidity (always a red flag), zero-day token launch with immediate pool seeding, and single-point-of-failure architecture where one address controlled the kill switch. No timelock mechanisms. No multi-sig safeguards. No governance structures. The specimen was essentially a loaded gun pointed at early adopters' capital reserves. We've seen this pathology thousands of times. It never ends differently.
Victim Impact: $8,222 USD in aggregate losses distributed across an estimated 40-80 retail participants. Most likely ETH holders who bought at launch, watching their positions bleed to zero as liquidity evaporated. The emotional trauma—the messages we see in community discord servers, the rage posts, the small investors checking their wallets every five minutes—remains clinically documented but technically outside our scope.
Pathologist's Note: Relay3rV1 presents as a Grade-A rug pull specimen. Zero complexity, maximum lethality. The deployer didn't even bother with sophisticated obfuscation—just created a token, seeded liquidity, then harvested it like seasonal crops. In my thirty-thousand-autopsy career, I've learned this about crypto: the simplest schemes remain the deadliest. No contracts can protect you from someone who owns the game board. Another one for the pile. Next case.
"Relay3rV1 flatlined after deployer systematically drained liquidity pools. $8.2K disappeared into the void. Another textbook rug pull with all the warning signs of a weekend project gone predatory."
Data from De.Fi REKT Database